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Reconciling the Abortion Choice:
 




The Foundation of Adjudicated Privacy Rights
 
Nowhere in the United States Constitution did the framers specifically 
grant a right to privacy to the citizens of the United States. In fact, not 
until the landmark 1965 Supreme Court decision in Griswold v. 
Connecticut was such a right found unambiguously to exist. In Griswold, 
the Court found that a Connecticut law outlawing the use of contraceptives 
between married persons was violative of a "right to privacy" protected by 
the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause (which applies the 
original Bill of Rights to the states) and the Ninth Amendment, which 
states "The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be 
construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people." In other 
words, just because the Constitution doesn't explicitly grant a right to 
privacy, that does not mean one does not exist. Further, in 1972, the Court 
found unconstitutional a similar Massachusetts law outlawing distribution 
of contraceptives to unmarried persons, expanding its Griswold decision 
(Eisenstadt v. Baird). 
Nineteen Seventy-three was a watershed year for the right to privacy 
and the right to choose to have an abortion. In Roe v. Wade, the Court 
found a "concept of personal 'liberty' embodied in the Fourteenth 
Amendment's Due Process Clause; or in personal, marital, familial, and 
sexual privacy said to protected by the Bill of Rights or its penumbras, 
(Griswold; Eisenstadt); or among those rights reserved to the people by 
the Ninth Amendment" (Griswold). 
These three cases (along with Roe's sister case Doe v. Bolton) form 
the foundation of the right to privacy as adjudicated by the Supreme 
Court. In establishing, consolidating, and eventually redefining that right, 
abortion has stood in the limelight. 
Abortion in Society 
The Roe decision, written by Justice Harry A. Blackmun, offered eight 
societal opinions on or concerning abortion. These were 1) ancient 
attitudes; 2) the Hippocratic Oath; 3) common law; 4) English statutory 
law; 5) American law; 6) the position of the American Medical 
Association; 7) the position of the American Public Health Association; 
and 8) the position of the American Bar As sociation . 
According to Roe, ancient attitudes concerning abortion were 
generally free. While abortion was prosecuted in the Persian Empire, the 
basis for this was largely a "concept of a violation of the father's right to 
his offspring" (Roe). Greek and Roman societies were especially free with 
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abortion and "afforded little protection to the unborn" (Roe). Abortion 
also was not barred by ancient religion. In fact, abortion was acceptable to 
the Roman Catholic Church into the Nineteenth century, based on St. 
Thomas Aquinas' theory that "ensoulment" of the fetus did not take place 
until forty to eighty days after conception (Webster v. Reproductive 
Health Services). 
The Hippocratic Oath states, "...I will not give to a woman an abortive 
remedy." However, according to Dr. J. Edelstein, quoted in Roe, "Most 
Greek thinkers... commended abortion,... For the Pythagoreans, however, 
it was a matter of dogma... The abortion clause of the Oath... 'echoes 
Pythagorean doctrines,' and '[i]n no other stratum of Greek opinion were 
such views held or proposed in the same spirit of uncompromising 
austerity" (Roe). 
In common law (court-made, not legislator-made, law), abortion was 
undisputably legal prior to "quickening," "the first recognizable 
movement of the fetus in utero..." Although there were differing views in 
common law as to whether abortion of a quick fetus was a misdemeanor, 
manslaughter, or no offense at all, the decision in Roe states "it now 
appear[s] doubtful that abortion was ever firmly established as a common 
law crime even with respect to the destruction of a quick fetus." 
English statutory law has grown less strict on the abortion issue as time 
goes by. In statutes enacted in 1803, 1828, 1837, 1861, and 1929, 
abortion was a felony except to preserve the life of the mother. In Rex v. 
Bourne (1939), an English court modified the word 'life' to include 
health. Finally, the Abortion Act of 1967 allows physicians to take into 
account maternal life, physical and/or mental health; the health of existing 
children; possible disabilities or handicaps of the unborn fetus; and even 
"...the pregnant woman's actual or reasonably foreseeable environment" 
(Roe; emphasis added). 
The United States began adopting abortion statutes as early as 1821, 
with Connecticut distinguishing between quick and unquickened fetuses. 
Common law however, was generally in effect in the united States as far as 
abortion was concerned until after the Civil War. After the Civil War, most 
states that enacted abortion statutes made the quickening distinction. Most 
also allowed post quickening abortions to preserve the "life" of the 
mother. By the late Nineteenth century, however, the quickening distinc­
tion had largely disappeared and the penalties for abortion had generally 
increased. By the end of the 1950's, almost all jurisdictions had banned 
abortion except to save the life of the mother. The Court in Roe 
interpreted the history of abortion in American society in this way: 
It is apparent that at common law, at the time of the adoption of 
our Constitution, and throughout the major portion of the 
Nineteenth century... a woman enjoyed a SUbstantially broader 
right to terminate a pregnancy than she does... today... very 
possibly without such a limitation [on stage of pregnancy], the 
opportunity to make this choice was present in this country well 
into the Nineteenth century (Roe) . 
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In 1871, the American Medical Association's Committee on Criminal 
Abortion submitted to the AM.A Annual Meeting a report condemning 
abortion; it was adopted. Once again, it provided for the preservation of 
the mother's health, but only with the concurring judgment of a 
"respectable" physician. The A.M.A.'s Committee on Human 
Reproduction in 1967 opposed abortion except in cases of 1) a threat to 
the health or life of the mother; 2) a physical deformity or mental 
deficiency of the unborn fetus; or 3) rape or incest. This recommendation 
was also adopted. And" [o]n June 23, 1970, the House of Delegates 
adopted preambles emphasiz[ing] 'the best interests of the patient,' 'sound 
clinical judgment,' and 'informed patient consent,' in contrast to 'mere 
acquiescence to the patient's demand'" (Roe). 
The most liberal platform in American society has been that of the 
American Public Health Association. In 1970, it drafted its Standards for 
Abortion Services. These standards instructed that 1) "Rapid and simple 
abortion referral must be readily available through state and local public 
health departments, medical societies, or other non-profit organizations;" 
2) "An important function of counseling should be to simplify and 
expedite the provision of abortion services; it should not delay the 
obtaining of these services;" 3) "Psychiatric consultation should not be 
mandatory...;" 4) "... trained... volunteers to highly-skilled physicians 
may qualify as abortion counselors;" and 5) "Contraception and/or 
sterilization should be discussed with each abortion patient;" 
(Recommended Standards for Abortion Services, 61 Am. 1. Pub. Health 
396 (1971». 
Finally, the American Bar Association, in drafting its 1972 
Uniform Abortion Act, sought to accomplish what Roe eventually did, a 
standard for a national uniform abortion law. The AB.A. adopted a 
moderate position on which it appears Roe was partially based. Abortions 
were unregulated the first twenty weeks of pregnancy; afterward, abortion 
could only be performed to save the lifelhealth of the mother, to abort a 
fetus with mental/physical defects, or in cases of rape and incest. In the 
summer of 1991, the AB.A voted to adopt a resolution recognizing a 
woman's right to choose an abortion, roughly following the Roe trimester 
framework. After the loss of approximately two hundred members, 
however, the A.B.A bowed to internal pressure and rescinded the 
resolution. 
In Roe, the Court laid out three possible reasons that the state might 
have for outlawing abortion. The first justification was to deter illicit sex. 
The Court disregarded this as a viable excuse. The second was the risk 
involved in the abortion procedure. The Court noted that at the time most 
abortion statutes were enacted, the procedure was very hazardous. 
However, the advancement of medical technology, especially antiseptic 
techniques, has made abortion as safe (or safer) a procedure as childbirth 
at least through the first trimester. Through viability of the fetus (the time 
when it is capable of life outside the womb, roughly through the second 
trimester) abortion appears to be as safe (or as dangerous) as childbirth. 
By the third trimester (post-viability), childbirth is safer than the abortion 
procedure. This reasoning played a crucial part in what became the 
"trimester framework" of the Roe decision. The third possible justification 
I for the outlawing of abortion entertained by the Court was a "compelling 
state interest" to protect the life or future life of an unborn fetus. A state 
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must demonstrate a "compelling state interest" in order to override a 
fundamental right, in this case a woman's fundamental right to privacy. 
The state (Texas in Roe, Georgia in Doe) argued that its interest in 
protecting "potential life" overrode the right to privacy. The Court, known 
for manufacturing judicial "tests," adopted the "trimester framework" test 
in Roe. The result was a finding that state interest did not override the 
right to privacy in the first trimester (read: the state could place no 
restrictions on first trimester abortions). Further, state interest from the 
end of the first trimester until viability is limited to concern for the health 
of the mother (read: any restrictions placed by the state on second 
trimester abortions may only be to preserve the health of the mother and 
not the fetus). Finally, after viability, at which point the fetus may live 
outside the womb, the Court found that state interest in preserving fetal 
life overrode the right to privacy (read: in the third trimester (post­
viability) a state may go so far as to completely ban abortions, although 
not in cases of rape, incest, or to preserve maternal health). So, it appears 
that the Court, in manufacturing the "trimester framework," took into 
account both the risk associated with the abortion procedure as compared 
with childbirth, and the point at which the fetus becomes capable of life 
outside the mother. 
In rationalizing the abortion choice, the Roe opinion makes a strong 
social justification for abortion rights. The argument follows, 
The detriment that the State would impose upon the pregnant 
woman by denying this choice altogether is apparent. Specific and 
direct harm medically diagnosable even in early pregnancy may be 
involved. Maternity, or additional offspring, may force upon the 
woman a distressful life and future. Psychological harm may be 
imminent. Mental and physical health may be taxed by child care. 
There is also the distress, for all concerned, associated with the 
unwanted child, and there is the problem of bringing a child into a 
family already unable, psychologically and otherwise, to care for it. 
In other cases, as in this one, the additional difficulties and 
continUing stigma of unwed motherhood may be involved. All 
these are factors the woman and her responsible physician will 
consider in consultation (Roe). 
Throughout the Seventies, Roe remained unscathed for the most part. 
Only one decision, Maher v. Roe (1979), partly limited the decision in 
Roe. That decision upheld a Connecticut law that allowed state Medicaid 
funds for childbirth, but not for abortion. In 1983, the Court held that 
Akron, Ohio's local ordinances reqUiring a 24-hour waiting period prior 
to procuring an abortion, that all second and third trimester abordons be 
performed in a hospital, and that physicians be "vigorous" in counseling 
against an abortion were unconstitutional (Akron v. Akron Center for 
Reproductive Health) . , 
Nineteen Eighty-nine signalled the death knell for the trimester 
framework test. The majority in Webster v. Reproducive Health Services 
upheld a Missouri law which "f[ound]" that life begins at conception; 
mandates viability testing on any fetus thought to be twenty or more 
weeks old; and prohibits the use of pUblic employees, facilities, and funds 
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lion or "encouraging or counseling" 
a woman to have an abortion. However, the majority did not overturn Roe 
v. Wade, rather they reaffimed the woman's right to choose an abortion, 
yet they replaced the trimester framework test with the "undue burden" 
test. This new test allows a state to enact any statute restricting abortion 
that did not place an "undue burden" on a woman seeking an abortion. 
Justice Antonin Scalia, in concurring in the decision, scolded the Court for 
being 'irresponsible" in not overturning Roe. Justice Scalia wrote, 
It thus appears that the mansion of constitutionalized abortion-law, 
constructed overnight in Roe v. Wade, must be disassembled door­
jamb by door jamb, and never entirely brought down, no matter 
how wrong it may be (Webster). 
Justices Harry Blackmun, William Brennan, and Thurgood Marshall, 
dissenting from the decision, agreed that it effectively overturned Roe v. 
Wade. Malcolm Feeley and Samuel Krislov, in Constitutional Law, agree 
that "There is no question that Justice Scalia is correct. But by writing an 
opinion that upheld Webster, without explicitly overruling Roe, the Court 
has invited a prolonged period of litigation" (FeeleylKrislov 875). 
The first sign of that prolonged litigation came in early 1991 when 
the Court, in Rust v. Sullivan, held that a law forbidding abortion 
counseling in federally-funded clinics and mandating a prepared anti­
abortion speech to answer abortion inquiries was constitutional. Few 
scholars regarded this "gag rule" decision as good law, as it came 
dangerously close to impinging free speech rights. Whereas most legal 
scholars predicted that Rust would succumb to the same fate as other 
poorly thought out decisions, such as Dred Scott and Plessy ("separate but 
equal"), it was effectively overturned by President Bill Clinton through 
executive order early this year. 
Society's Impact on Abortion Rights:
 
Common Law, Natural Law, and Legal Realism
 
The largest role society plays in the area of abortion rights is that of 
lobbyist. Organized groups such as Operation Rescue and Planned 
Parenthood square off as they try to limit or expand these rights. As is 
often the case in our society, the group which currently sees itself as being 
on the losing side of this debate, the pro-lifers, is making the most noise. 
Aside from these groups, however, can the common theories of law in our 
society reconcile these two so opposite poles? 
English common law, from whence most of American law was derived 
early on, was somewhat obscure on the question of abortion. Some 
distinction surfaced between a quick andunquickened fetus. In all cases, 
abortion of an unquickened fetus was not a crime. In some cases, abortion 
of a quick fetus warranted a misdemeanor charge. In very rare cases, 
manslaughter. It was never fimly established, however, that destruction of 
a quick fetus was criminal under common law. Because common law 
governed abortion in this country from the ratification of our Constitution 
until the mid- to late-1800's, the Roe Court justified its decision based on 
the fact that women had the abortion choice for a great portion of our 
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nation's existence. Today, common law (judge-made law) in the United 
States relies much more on the political leanings of the judges and justices 
and much less on the judicial theory of stare decisis (a doctrine that 
translates to "let the decision stand" or respect precedent). The present 
conservative majority of the Court has weakened, if not overturned sub 
silento, Roe v. Wade, without regard to precedent. When there is again a 
liberal majority on the Court, the reverse will likely occur. Common law, 
as it now exhibits itself as political rather than judicial, probably does not 
carry as much weight as it used to, there being such little regard for 
precedent. In short, modem common law is sometimes laughable. 
Natural law must be argued from two aspects, religious-based and 
secular-based, because the amorphous concept of natural law has roots in 
both. From a religious standpoint, abortion may go either way. The Roe 
Court did much research throughout the course of the opinion. On the 
subject of religion, they made the following finding: 
There has always been strong support for the view that life does 
not begin until live birth. This was the belief of the Stoics. It 
appears to be the dominant. .. attitude of the Jewish faith. It may 
be taken to represent also the position of a large segment of the 
Protestant community (Roe). 
St. Thomas Aquinas' "ensoulment theory," that abortion of the seed prior 
to ensoulment (40-80 days after conception) was not the abortion of man, 
was "Roman Catholic dogma until the Nineteenth century" (Roe). Of 
course, the Catholic Church is now of the position that life begins at 
conception, as are many other religions that are not mentioned in Roe. It 
must be determined, therefore, that religious-based natural law, like 
common law, is unable to reconcile the abortion issue, as once again there 
are many differing opinions. 
Under secular-based natural law, abortion would probably only be 
legal under the special circumstances found in many restrictive statutes 
(I.e. preservation of the mother's health, rape, incest, etc.). Those ex­
ceptions would be considered "natural" because they are a therapeutic 
response. Abortion as birth control would probably be considered 
unnatural because it is a non-therapeutic operation in the strict sense of 
the term. However, interpreting the word "therapeutic" broadly enough to 
encompass mental health and emotional well-being may uphold abortion 
rights under secular based natural law. Furthermore, who really has the 
power to determine what is and is not natural? Like common law and 
religious-based natural law, we are left muddled by conflicting interpreta­
tions . 
Finally, we come to legal realism. Stephen Vago, in his book Law and 
Society, explains the legal realist thought process as co founded by Justice 
Oliver Wendall Holmes: 
....[J]udges are responsible for formulating "law, rather than merely 
finding it in law books. The judge always has to exercise choice 
when making a decision. He decides which principle will prevail 
and which party will win. According to the legal realist's position, 
judges make decisions on the basis of the conception of justness 
prior to resorting to formal legal precedents. Such precedents can 
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This idea of legal realism figures largely in how Roe v. Wade was 
decided and written. The majority found that guaranteeing the woman's 
choice to have an abortion was the just outcome, dependent upon what 
stage of pregnancy she wished to have an abortion. Suffering from a lack 
of modem precedents, they went as far back as Persian Greek and Roman 
societies to support their conclusion. This is not to say'that abortion is not 
criminal under the legal realist doctrine. The key phrase in Vago's 
definition is "[s]uch precedents can be found... to support almost any 
outcome." Had the Roe majority concluded that the state's compelling 
inte~est in salvaging the potential life of the fetus was more just, legal 
realIsm could have been applied to support that finding instead. In 
~eneral, legal realism most often appears when a) a majority (usually a 
lIberal one) ~ee~s to broaden some r~g~ts granted explicitly or implicitly 
by the ConstitutIon, or b) when a maJonty seeks to disregard stare decisis 
~d overturn a previous decision. Historically, legal realism has been a 
lIberal tool, but with the present conservative majority out to limit some 
liberal decisions, the conservative's might find themselves at the liberal's 
workbench. Once again, we are unable to reconcile the question of 
abortion rights with this, our third instrument. 
The Future 
The trimester fraDlework of Roe v. Wade has run its course. This is 
unfortunate. The trimester framework was the first, and as yet only 
uniform abortion law this nation has seen. It's the nearest we had to ~ 
reconciliation of the parties involved. Giving more to either side causes 
the other to have legitimate rights disparaged. Barring a constitutional 
aDlendment or an act of Congress, the as yet unsolvable question of 
abortion appears for some time to be in the hands of a Supreme Court 
that doesn't want it. 
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His name was originally Moo 
That's all we know. 
The only truly historic refere 
is a single line from the Annale 
539: "the Battle of Camlann, whe 
death in Britain and Ireland." I c( 
got it all wrong, and that "Moo 
Artorius, but it would be pointies 
there is for the minstrels' version 
going to get blurry; when you'rl 
other way to do it, because there'; 
the end, the distinction doesn't re 
SUCh, all of it becomes the history 
For the sake of the paper, let'~ 
are the events as they happened. 
his own belt-- without changin, 
pretations. Somewhere between 
Malory took pen in hand to fene 
child" became "evil counsel" -­
"bastard" a bad name. The word 
wouldn't be too surprised if its a 
the legend of Mordred, the litera 
Morgause, not even the feminis1 
unquestioned by the storytellers : 
knowledge, Mary Stewart was thf 
she felt pUlled into the "traditiona 
another hearing, fifteen hundred :, 
do the same thing for saints, don'. 
Nobody denies that Malory 
hodgepodge of troubadours' sot: 
semi-coherent story. However, by 
was too exhausted to go back at: 
his explanations simply don't rna:: 
Anthology picks up the story, Me 
whatever he can in whatever WI: 
nothing but the adjectives in con: 
and Malory himself doesn't 
comparison between Lancelot, w­
can do no active right, even whe 
one point in a joust, Lancelot bac 
ran off and dressed up as a wo 
woman's dress-- thereby totally t 
Dinadan to Lancelot, 'thou art so 
(Malory, p. 94); the Queen laug 
does it, it's funny; when MordreC 8
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